Since 1980, the International Law Commission (ILQ has been engaged in drafting a comprehensive convention on liability for damage arising out of acts not prohibited by international law. During its work, the TLC has increasingly focused on transboundary environmental damage. Thus, the project may have considerable impact on the further development of this area of international law.
Thomas Gearing and Marlcus Jachtenfuchs however, states have a strong interest in promoting certain activities and in according them a status of lawfulness, although these activities may entail transboundary risks. Therefore, such risks cannot be sufficiently regulated even by a detailed codification of the law of state responsibility.
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On the contrary, establishing too close a link between fault and the obligation to compensate for damage frequently does not result in an internationally accepted ban of a particular dangerous activity, but rather in a refusal by the source state to compensate; since any acceptance of the duty to repair damage would imply acknowledgement of a violation of international law and thus endanger the future operation of the activity in question.
IL The Project of the Internationa} Law Commission
This dilemma, which cannot satisfactorily be solved within the traditional system of international law, laid the foundation 8 for the International Law Commission's project on the codification and progressive development of the rules of international liability for damage caused by activities not prohibited by international law .9
A-Balancing Interests
The basic aim of Robert Quentin-Baxter, the first special rapporteur on the topic, was to retain as much freedom as possible for states to exploit their resources, and at the same time to strengthen the rights of possibly affected (neighbouring) states. 10 His concept was based on the expectation that states would accept risk creating activities in other states more easily if a mutually acceptable preventive and compensatory legal regime could be agreed upon. Therefore, the transfer of the existing principle of balancing interests to the area of transboundary environmental risks below the level of an undisputed breach of a rule of international law 11 should be in the general interest of both the source and the affected state, since it provides both sides with an opportunity for an active formation of mutual relations.
The theoretical question of the lawfulness of an activity is necessarily rendered less important once a state on whose territory and under whose control a risk creating activity is carried out reaches a mutual agreement with affected (neighbouring) states upon the rights and obligations in connection with that activity and the risks involved. Agreement had to include the duties of prevention prior to and compensation after possible future damage. In this case, obligations of prevention and liability for potential damage could be separated from an investigation of the lawfulness of the harm creating activity and its operation, 12 since the rights and obligations of the states involved were based on agreement, i.e. exclusively on primary rules of international law. The necessity of first establishing a breach of a rule of international law would thus be avoided. This approach removed the *mphmri« of the project away from identifying a clear dividing line between the two p< ejects of the ILC on international responsibility for wrongful acts and international liability for consequences of acts not prohibited by international law. Instead it focused on so1vt"g thf pnwt»"»l prpfrWn of assuring (•onipaiE»ri"n frthf victim* of trambo»rKinTy environmental damage." In addition, it must be emphasized that a clear distinction between source and affected states is only meaningful for a limited number of instances of transboundary environmental damage. In many cases, the conflicting parties are faced with a more complex mutual relationship because they pursue similar activities and are thus at the same time ^»"""g risks, injuries and suffering. This is particularly true for activities: they cause risks and injuries and are at the same time victims of similar risks and injuries. For instance, most European states operate nuclear power stations and thus create risks, however small/of transboundary nuclear contamination. At the same time, all of them are suffering similar risks of potential future damage created elsewhere. Here, the solution of transboundary environmental problems cannot be limited to an improvement of mechanisms for compensation. Instead, comprehensive regimes accommodating the interests of all states concerned are needed. This requires co-operation with the aim of solving partial conflicts within an overall balance of interests. From this point of view, codification of international law in the field of liability for environmental damage is only one element within a general regulation which also comprises the elements of prevention and minimization of damage.
On the basis of these considerations, the first special rapporteur in his Schematic Outline of the project 14 proposed a framework convention containing procedural guidelines for the elaboration of detailed regimes governing specific cases. This framework convention should primarily have a catalytic function for the adoption of a multitude of concrete bilateral or multilateral agreements. 13 In order to facilitate early negotiations between the states concerned, this procedure should already apply to the planning stage of a dangerous activity. The Schematic Outline therefore created a close linkbetween the elements of safety, information and compensation within a single regime ('the continuum of prevention and reparation') 16 and thus enlarged the scope of the project beyond the formal mandate given to the ILC In order to avoid the expected resistance of a multitude of states against rigid liability rules, Quentin-Baxter's concept deliberately did not include any compensatory automatism which would have amounted to strict liability. The necessary consequence was a certain 'negotiability' of the obligation to repair damage in cases where the states concerned had not agreed on a specific regime before damage occurred.
B. The Obligation to Repalr
In 1985, the Argentine diplomat Julio Barboza succeeded Quentm-Baxter in the influential function of the special rapporteur for the project He had been critical of the widening of the scope of the project and of the vague status of the obligation to compensate for damage.
Despite difficulties inherent in the integration of preventive and reparative elements in a single instrument, he nevertheless declared his intention to basically maintain the now undisputed integradve approach. 17 Whereas obligations of preventive action and of information are increasingly For the present special rapporteur, the core of the project consisted initially in shifting the economic burden of transnational environmental H«m»gg to the source state which, after all, gained profit from its risk creating activities. His early reports indicated that within the project he intended to focus on the residual regime regulating the obligations to repair damage. The principle of strict liability of the source state therefore had to be the starting point of any conceptualization of the right of reparation on the part of the affected state; given that in the case of activities not prohibited by international law the element of subjective or objective fault is lacking by definition. 20 Starting from this principle, negotiations between states concerned could be directed at a limitation of liability in particular cases on the basis of a balance of interests. This approach meant that the development of a detailed and generally applicable regime on liability for transboundary environmental damage became the centerpiece of the project 2 * Since the intention of the project would remain the encouragment of states to conclude agreements regulating specific activities with transboundary implications, the general liability regime would fulfil a subsidiary function. Activities governed by specific regimes were thus only indirectly affected by this shift of emphasis. However, liability of the source state for activities not covered by specific regimes would be considerably reinforced, although it would be to some degree negotiable.
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The question remained whether a liability regime putting high economic risks upon suites would eventually be accepted by these states. In 1990, the special rapporteur therefore proposed, within a comprehensive set of draft articles, a new chapter which was intended to reinforce private remedies for compensation of transboundary environmental harm. 23 However, this step did not mitigate the impact of the envisaged rigid obligation of state liability, but simply attempted to assure a minimum degree of uniformity of private remedies. 24 While so far the principle of liability of the source state for transboundary environmental damage from activities carried out by private parties had been considered as being widely acceptable, the majority of states commenting on the project in the Sixth Committee now favoured placing primary liability on the The special rapporteur and me majority of the Commission 26 responded positively to this new development Although the detailed structure of the general regime on environmental liability is not yet clearly visible, it may therefore be nsmrniH that the focus of the project has shifted from international liability (mitigated by private remedies) to private liability (possibly to be reinforced by some residual liability of the authorizing state). The direction of this important turn of the ILCproject 27 is largely in conformity with existing conventional liability regimes or those still under preparation.
HL Environmental Liability Regimes in Multilateral Agreements
In the past three decades, states have concluded a number of conventions containing primary liability rules with respect to some specific risk creating activities, especially in the areas of international maritime, nuclear, and space law. In some cases, they accepted state liability. This should however not lead to the conclusion that states were generally prepared to be held liable for transnational environmental damage. On the contrary, an examination of the conventional regimes reveals a more differentiated picture of existing state practice with far-reaching consequences for the future development of the international law of environmental liability. For a realistic analysis of the emergence and later application of liability rules it is indispensable to take into account how these rules actually came into being, to explore which groups participated in the law making process and to identify their regulatory interests. The following chapter will analyze the extent to which it is possible to draw generalizations from the most important existing conventional liability regimes, with a view to establishing a general regime.
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A. liability for Maritime Transport of Oil: A Model for Transnational Environmental Liability Regimes
With regard to its ecological, economic, and political goals, the regime of liability for damage caused by maritime transport of oil constitutes a model for modern environmental liability agreements. Its emergence started in 1967, immediately after the accident of the oil carrier Torrey Canyon' which had caused hitherto unprecedented damage in the English Channel. The accident clearly demonstrated that risks relating to the transport of oil had considerably increased with the operation of super tankers and the growth of maritime transport in general All preventive measures as well as the existing liability rules for maritime transport proved to be insufficient. The British government faced important financial claims partly due to costs of clean-up measures and partly due to the political necessity to take over the considerable losses which had occurred to private persons and territorial authorities.29 it therefore asked the states represented in the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) to draw consequences from the The industry concerned favoured a solution in the framework of existing private maritime liability law. Contrary to shipping interests organized in the Comite" maritime international, the oil industry announced that it was ready to cooperate within certain limits. In 1968, major oil companies adopted voluntarily a private liability regime, 32 initially exclusively applicable to their own tankers, but after a year it already covered more than 90 per cent of the world tanker fleet The voluntary regime facilitated acceptance of the concept of a liability channelled toward the ship owner and limited to an insurable amount A diplomatic conference meeting in 1969,33 which was held in order to adopt an international convention incorporating the new rules into the body of international law, was characterized by the conflict of two groups of states divided over the issues of the type and amount of liability. In general, coastal states, being possible victims of pollution, opted for strict liability. The states with their own tanker fleets promoted the principle of fault liability, however modified by a reversal of the burden of proof. Thus, a polarity of interests emerged which seems to be typical for negotiations on the allocation of the economic burden of environmental harm linked to an activity that is itself widely considered beneficiaL Whereas the majority of participating states was at the same time dependent on the maritime transport of oil and, as coastal states, exposed to the environmental risks involved in the activity, most delegations nevertheless clearly joined one of the two camps.
In order to avoid a breakdown of negotiations, the model of an exclusive liability of the ship owner was supplemented during the conference by the establishment of an international oil pollution compensation fund thus providing an additional layer of liability and transferring part of the economic burden to the oil processing industry. This made the initially strong resistance against an introduction of the principle of strict liability almost disappear. Accordingly, the final text of the convention 34 establishment of an international fund seemed to be more acceptable to states than a subsidiary liability of the controlling, i.e. flag state. During the drafting process of the fund convention, 33 a direct participation of states in the financing of the fund was never seriously considered. By establishing a privately financed voluntary compensation scheme 36 during the preparatory phase of the fund, the oil processing industry demonstrated its general agreement with the envisaged second layer of liability. The international fund could thus be based on die rules of this private modeL
Since die establishment of the oil liability regime of 1969/71, in no case have states, even on a subsidiary basis, been prepared to take over inter-govemmental liability obligations. This is not surprising with regard to activities which are sufficiently profitable so as not to require a shift of economic risks of costly environmental damage to the public. The capacity of die insurance market has considerably enlarged during the past two decades. This, combined with the availability of additional compensation from the international fund, should mean that liability for oil pollution damage can be covered by the polluting industry alone.
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The basic principle of this combined regime 38 which stipulates a strengthened liability to be bom exclusively by the profit gaining private industry, has been incorporated into the (draft) rules of international regulations of liability for damage created by bom maritime 39 and inland transport 40 of dangerous goods and into a convention which regulates oil drilling activities in die North Sea area.
41 All these regulations aim at an improvement of compensation for victims of transnational environmental pollution, including states.
B. The Nuclear Liability Conventions
The regulatory goal of international law on liability for nuclear damage was completely different It was primarily conceived to relieve the nuclear supply industry of the incalculable risks posed by high compensation claims. To achieve this goal, the nuclear liability conventions 'channel' the duty to compensate exclusively to die operator of a nuclear installation. They thus exonerate all other parties involved in die development of nuclear energy from any obligation to compensate for nuclear damage.
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In the 1950s, tbc United States supply industry, whose cooperation seemed to be indispensable for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, was not prepared to take over the incalculable economic risk involved in this new activity..The development of the new and promising technology threatened to be hampered unless the state or the operator of the nuclear installation were to take over full liability. At that time insurance companies were certainly not capable of covering these economic risks. 42 In 1957, therefore, the US legislator felt obliged to channel Lability exclusively to the operator of a nuclear installation and to exonerate all other parlies completely from the economic risks of possible nuclear damage. The state took over the part of the economic risk which could not be covered by private insurance.
In its early years, the exploitation of nuclear energy in Western Europe was almost completely dependent on the American supply industry . 4 3 Again, an effective limitation of liability was required to avoid a cut of essential supplies. Therefore, the US nuclear energy legislation 44 
Thomas Gehring and Markus Jachtenfuchs C The Space liability Convention
The Space Liability Convention 33 is frequently cited in support of the hypothesis that states were already prepared to accept liability for transboundary environmental harm in specific areas. 54 In tact, the convention stipulates a mechanism for reparation along the lines of traditional international law. Reparation of damage takes place exclusively among states; insurance companies, persons privately liable, and domestic courts as well as private victims remain outside the regime. However, the economic aspect of compensation was not a major issue during the formulation of the convention.
jpcti»aH i the high military and strategic impnrt«n<*» of outer space determined the course of the negotiations. In the beginning of the 1960s, both superpowers feared a militarization of outer space which, for various reasons, was not in their interests. 33 In the first place political agreements were needed to both provide a secure legal framework for space operations and to avoid an arms race in outer space. Given these political and military problems, negotiations on questions relating to the use of this area were held in a political forum, the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and not in a technical' one, as had been the case for the nuclear and oil liability regimes.
36
In a climate characterized by mutual distrust between the superpowers, but of basically identical interests, the Outer Space Treaty 37 was concluded as a framework agreement in 1966. It obliges states to supervise and control all space activities starting from their territory and renders them liable for damage resulting from these activities. This provision was strongly influenced by a dispute on the general admissibility of private space activities.
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Since 1962 the Space Liability Convention has been negotiated simultaneously with the Outer Space Treaty. It cannot therefore be considered an independent environmental liability regime. TiwtwiH, it is a detailed elaboration of the liability provision of a highly political general framework. This explains why conflicts on economic aspects of liability have been of secondary importance. 3^ The space industry submitted numerous proposals in attempting to achieve a liability regime modelled along the lines of the nuclear liability treaties, without however achieving more than marginal impact on the negotiation process. Even the United States from the outset proposed an exclusive liability of the controlling state without private participation. In order not to endanger political agreement, the two superpowers, at that time the only states with technical capabilities for space missions, finally accepted even the principle of unlimited liability. The rule of uniimifH international liability, as envisaged in the Space Liability Convention, is, therefore, essentially not the result of economic or environmental concern but of a global political arrangement The regulatory interest of the contracting states consisted only partly in shifting the economic burden of damage arising from a space casualty to the state controlling the activity. The participating states possessing the capabilities for space activities appeared to be more interested in the political result of a regulation as such, than in the details of the liability regime.
IV. Private Liability and International Regulatory Obligations
The degree to which states were in the past prepared to accept liability obligations was determined by the regulatory goals of the respective regimes. The type of detailed international liability envisaged in the Space Liability Convention corresponds to a specific political constellation which is not typical for the regulation of transnational environmental damage. It can hardly be considered a true precedent for a general environmental liability regime. In the context of the different nuclear liability regimes, the distribution of economic consequences of potential damage were of overwhelming importance, whereas environmental considerations played only a minor role. The regulatory goal was the facilitation of a risk creating infant industry through limitation of its liability. Only for that purpose did states accept the obligation of a subsidiary state finanr^H liability. Therefore, this type of combined liability regime does not provide a true precedent for a general regulation of liability for transboundary environmental damage.
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In contrast, the liability regime for oil pollution damage could serve as a model for future rules on liability for transboundary environmental damage. Its regulatory goal was the improvement of the victims' situation, and regimes similar to this type are presently under discussion, or have been adopted, for a series of comparable risks. 61 The relative success of this model relies on its specific sharing of burden between private operators of dangerous or harmful activities and states authorizing and controlling these activities.
States have long since acknowledged the necessity to improve existing liability rules and accepted an obligation to regulate the issue, but they have not been prepared to contribute financially to the compensation of transboundary environmental damage. 62 Yet the situation of private victims and affected states regarding compensation was, or will be, considerably improved. 
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What are the consequences of this legal development for state responsibility or international ljflfri]ity fnrtTTignfltinnnl mvrmtmwmfal <tam»g»7Th* iilVgnH ftieinrtimi h*nvr*n m1*« r>f private liability and those of international responsibility is certainly not as clear-cut as is assumed by many authors. In fact, 'private' conventional regimes strongly interfere with existing obligations of me controlling state regarding reparation of damage. 63 The interrelationship between private and international mechanisms for compensation of given A*m»fi* i& most visibly illustrated by international nuclear liability law. Under the regimes of the Brussels Supplementary Convention and the Nuclear Ship Convention, licensing states accepted relatively high liability obligations compared to privately financed funds. Within the framework of conventional regimes, claims are settled according to an established procedure by domestic courts without proof of fault and primarily out of public funds. Due to the relative simplicity of this procedure, claims will be made and compensation paid in the first place on the basis of the liability conventions, even though a breach of international law by the controlling state might be provable (e.g. in cases of insufficient supervision). As long as international conflicts on liability issues can be solved in a satisfactory manner by using simplified conventional procedures, states will not insist on basing their claims on the comparatively vague rules of state responsibility. To be sure, the reason for this is the existence of an applicable, detailed and agreed upon procedure to settle claims. It is not the public governed by mixed regimes will also be true for incidents governed by exclusively privately financed liability regimes/* This is not to argue that a reasonable settlement of compensation claims for transboundary environmental harm is best dealt with exclusively under private law. On the contrary, they should be governed by international law.^5 for only states can set internationally recognized norms which arc sufficiently uniform and authoritative and which can, accordingly, be expected to be generally observed. Conventional liability regimes provide a medium layer between purely private claims for compensation of victims of transboundary environmental harm on the basis of domestic law and reparation made from state to state on the basis of traditional international law. Individual claims for, and transfers of, compensation are formally and financially a matter of private law, but they are governed by conventional regimes that are part of international law and have even led to the creation of an inter-governmental organization, namely the oil pollution compensation fund. This type of international regulation of compensation for the consequences of transboundary environmental damage constitutes a category of international law which does not fit in with the traditional dichotomy of the legal order.* Accordingly, the conventional liability regimes, whether they comprise obligations of the licensing states to contribute to compensation of damage or not, overlap with the traditional concept of state responsibility. Such overlapping is unavoidable because different criteria apply to the two concepts. 67 It even became one of the aims of the projected general rules on liability for transnational environmental damage presently under discussion in the International Law Commission, as it provides a means to side-step the de facto inapplicable traditional concept of state responsibility. 68 An authoritative international regime which shifts liability obligations effectively onto the respective private operators does not only economically exonerate the state community at large from compensatory claims. It also has direct implications on the development of applicable norms on state responsibility or inter-governmental liability. The better 'civil' liability agreements are adapted to specific risks of transboundary harm, the less urgent is the drafting and refining of general provisions of state responsibility and international liability up to the point at which they become applicable. There is no indication that this reluctance of states has fimHum^ntniiy changed and that they are now ready to accept a convention imposing on them a general international liability for transnational environmental damage.
The Commission should thus take into account the ran tinning process of separation between regulatory obligations on tbe part of the state community and actual liability obligations on tbe part of private operators of risk creating activities. It is argued here that a convention which is not limited to easily identifiable specific risks should therefore remain below the level of a fullfledged state liability. In its attempt to integrate private and state liabilities, tbe Commission should attach priority to the concept of balancing of interests. It would already amount to a profound transformation of tbe international law of liability for environmental harm if tbe ILC succeeded in codifying a widely accepted international instrument that promotes the increasing acceptance of regulatory obligations by states. This effect would dramatically broaden the scope of liability regimes that are privately financed but internationally governed and controlled. international fund; lee the preparatory documents UNHVCHW/WG. 1/2/3. and UNEP/CHW/WG.l/ 3 of an expert group established for that purpose.
